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I. INTRODUCTION
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Inter-
national Sale of Goods ("CISG") was adopted on April 11, 1980,
and ratified by the United States Senate in 1986. The CISG
entered into force between the United States and other States'
Parties on January 1, 1988. The CISG has been used to settle
thousands of contract disputes around the world by various ju-
risdictions. However, United States' courts have interpreted
and applied the CISG in only a limited number of instances.
In Geneva Pharmaceuticals Technology Corp. v. Barr Labo-
ratories, Inc. et al. lApothecon, Inc. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc. et
al. ("Geneva"),1 the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York interpreted and defined the limited scope of the
CISG. The district court's refusal to apply the CISG to certain
aspects of the contract between the parties, despite the overall
international character of the agreement and the intention of
the CISG to govern and ensure the observance of good faith in
international trade, is contrary to the intent of the CISG. Part
II of this note traces the historical and statutory background of
the CISG, including legislative history of the Articles' relevant
to the Geneva decision. Part III reviews the facts, procedural
history, reasoning, and holding of the district court's ruling in
Geneva, while Part IV examines the district court's correct ap-
plication of the CISG regarding certain aspects of the contract
and its misguided application of New Jersey domestic law with
respect to other issues of the contract. Finally, Part V asserts
that the district court's application of New Jersey domestic law
to issues of a purely international nature completely under-
mines the significance of the CISG. Furthermore, if American
courts follow the precedent set by the district court in Geneva
and continue to rule in this manner, they will effectively sub-
vert and deem the CISG ineffective as governing law in interna-
tional disputes.
1 201 F. Supp. 2d 236 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) [hereinafter Geneva].
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II. HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY BACKGROUND OF THE CISG
A. History of the CISG
On April 11, 1980, a diplomatic conference in Vienna of
sixty-two states unanimously approved the CISG, a convention
providing uniform law for international sales of goods. 2 The
CISG "governs both the formation of many international sales
contracts and the rights and obligations of parties to these con-
tracts."3 There are at least two areas of sales law in each of the
Contracting States that have ratified the Convention: domestic
sales law and the CISG.4 Since sixty-two states have adopted
the CISG, its text may be becoming "the basis for a modern lex
mercatoria,5 which will make it less necessary to consult uncer-
tain conflict-of-law rules and to apply the domestic sales law of
foreign states."6 "The CISG does not preempt domestic laws
that outlaw certain transactions or invalidate proscribed con-
tracts and oppressive terms; outside this narrow area, the CISG
protects the contractual arrangements made by the parties."7
Moreover, international parties have the option of excluding the
CISG from their contract, resulting in the terms of their con-
tract overcoming any conflicting uniform law provision.8 The
CISG's rules provide answers to issues that the parties failed to
address by contract, similar to the supporting role performed by
domestic sales rules such as the United States' Uniform Com-
mercial Code. 9
2 See INTERNATIONAL SALES: THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CON-
TRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 1-2 (Nina M. GaIston & Hans Smit,
eds., 1984) [hereinafter Galston].
3 Id. See also United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18, reprinted in [19801 XI UNCITRAL Year-
book 149, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/
partI/chapterX/treatyl7.asp [hereinafter CISGI.
4 See id.
5 Lex mercatoria (Latin for "mercantile law") is a system of customary law
that developed in Europe during the Middle Ages and regulated the dealings of
mariners and merchants in all the commercial countries of the world until the 17th
century. Many of the law merchant's principles came to be incorporated into the
common law, which in turn formed the basis of the Uniform Commercial Code. See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 715 (7th ed. 2000).
6 Galston, supra note 2, at 1-2.
7 JOHN 0. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE
1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 3 (Kluwer Law Int'l 1999).
8 See id. at 3-4.
9 See id. at 4.
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The "power of agreement" is dealt with by the CISG in two
significant ways.10 "First, the CISG itself was produced by
agreement."1 Individual States from a cross-section of world
economies reached an agreement and established, as Con-
tracting States, that they would use the Convention's rules in-
stead of their own domestic laws with respect to international
sales contracts.1 2 However, buyers and sellers still retain the
autonomy to determine the contractual language that best suits
their needs.' 3 Domestic trade can be constrained or barred by
the individual governments of some countries.' 4 Nevertheless,
"with the collapse of imperial and economic empires, commer-
cial enterprises cannot compel parties in other countries to
trade with them and, with the development of international
competition, cannot dictate contract terms."15 In order to
thrive, international trade relies on agreement between the
parties, whereas domestic trade may be managed by national
governments.' 6 Therefore, it is necessary to examine the devel-
opmental and historical background of the CISG in order to
comprehend its importance in the international sales
community.
For over fifty years, sales law experts attempted to formu-
late uniform legal rules governing international sales con-
tracts.' 7 The adoption of the 1980 Vienna Convention marked
the conclusion of those efforts.18 The development of legal rules
governing international sales contracts can be traced back to
three stages.' 9 In the 1930s, the Institute for the Unification of
Private Law assembled a group of sales law experts from Eu-
rope and assigned them the task of preparing a draft text of
uniform sales rules. 20 Several draft texts were subsequently
10 See id.
11 See id.
12 See id. A list of CISG Contracting States is available at http://
www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/countries/cntries.html. (last visited Feb. 4, 2003).
13 See HONNOLD, supra note 7, at 4.
14 See id.
15 See id.
16 See id.
17 See Galston, supra note 2, at 1-3.
18 See id.
19 See id.
20 See id.
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prepared. 21 Based on these draft texts, "a number of basic pol-
icy decisions on the scope and content of uniform sales rules
survive in the 1980 Convention."22 The second stage honed ear-
lier texts and culminated with the adoption of uniform sales
laws at the 1964 Conference at The Hague. 23 The final stage
began due to the narrow international recognition of the 1964
uniform laws. 24 The newly established U.N. Commission on In-
ternational Trade Law was given the task of studying the rea-
sons for the narrow recognition of the 1964 uniform laws, this
gave rise to the drafting of the 1980 Vienna Convention.25
The origin of the Vienna Convention begins with the April
29, 1930 appointment of a working group of experts by the In-
ternational Institute for the Unification of Private Law
("UNIDROIT") to prepare a uniform international sales law.26
The working group was made up of representatives from
France, Germany, England, and Scandinavia - representatives
from the "four principal systems of law which are concerned in
any scheme for unification, namely, the Anglo-American, the
Latin, the Germanic, and the Scandinavian systems."27 A first
draft of a Uniform International Law of Sales was completed in
1935 and subsequently distributed to various governments for
their remarks by the League of Nations. 28 The notion of a uni-
fied law of international sales was internationally supported
and most governments approved the 1935 draft text; however,
the businessmen of several countries suggested to their respec-
tive governments that the unification project was unneces-
sary.29 Based on the comments from interested governments,
21 See id.
22 See Galston, supra note 2, at 1-3.
23 See id.
24 See id. at 1-4.
25 See id.
26 See id.
27 Galston, supra note 2, at 1-5.
28 See id.
29 See id. In one country, opponents of the unification project contended that
the draft deviated too much from their own law, while their colleagues from an-
other country stated that the changes in existing law, which the act would intro-
duce, would be too slight to justify the inconveniences involved in its adoption. At
the time of completion of the draft in 1935, there had already been a protest
against the unification of sales law in one country because the matter had recently
been dealt with in a new code, and in another because the matter was going to be
regulated soon in a new code and was difficult enough without considering the
5
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the committee prepared a second draft that became available
just as World War II commenced, making it impossible to con-
tinue collaboration. 30 Despite the war halting this collabora-
tion, one can trace many of the basic decisions about the scope
of rules governing international sales contracts to these early
texts. In 1950, the governing body of UNIDROIT persuaded the
government of the Netherlands to convoke a conference to the
previously drafted texts of the mid to late 1930s. At this confer-
ence, participants appointed a new special commission of ex-
perts from Western European countries to prepare a revised
text of the 1939 draft.31
In 1964, the government of the 'Netherlands assembled an-
other international diplomatic conference at The Hague to con-
sider the reports submitted by the special commission and
UNIDROIT.32 Twenty-eight nations sent delegations to the
April 1964 conference, mostly from Western Europe. 33 How-
ever, the U.S. and several Eastern European countries were of-
ficially represented at the conference. 34 After three weeks, the
conference adopted two conventions: [T]he Uniform Law on the
International Sale of Goods ("ULIS"); and the Uniform Law on
the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
("ULF"). 35 However, it soon became apparent that the ULIS
and ULF would not be widely adopted. 36 There were com-
plaints about the sphere of the laws' applications, the abstract-
ness of several key concepts, and the failure to consider the
interests of many third world and socialist countries that had
not participated in the 1964 conference. 37 United States com-
mentators were finally asked for their contributions to an inter-
draft. Furthermore, it has also been articulated that the objections to the unifica-
tion project were rooted in a tendency by businessmen to preserve tradition and
legal continuity of laws, rather than move expeditiously toward universal jurispru-
dence and the unification of sales law. See Ernst Rabel, A Draft of an Interna-
tional Law of Sales, 5 U. CHI. L. REV. 543, 563 (1938).
30 See id.
31 See id. at 1-8.
32 See Galston, supra note 2, at 1-9.
33 See id.
34 See id.
35 See id.
36 See id. at 1-12.
37 See id. at 1-12 - 1-13.
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national, unified sales law after not being formally invited to
participate in the pre-1964 drafting process. 38
The Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCI-
TRAL") was established by the U.N. General Assembly in 1966.
Its task was to promote the "progressive harmonization and
unification of the law of international trade."39 Initially, a
Working Group of fourteen members was appointed by the
Commission; however, a fifteenth member was later added.40
The principal responsibility of the Working Group was to "de-
termine whether the 1964 uniform laws could be modified to
increase their acceptability, or whether completely new texts
should be drafted."41 Subsequently, it was decided by the
Working Group that a new draft text based on the ULIS and
ULF would provide the utmost prospect for increased accepta-
bility of a uniform sales law.42 Between 1970 and 1978, the
group met a total of nine times: seven times to consider the text
of an improved sales convention and two times to draft rules
governing the formation of sales contracts. 43 A draft sales text
was submitted to UNCITRAL in 1977. 4 4 In 1978, the group
proffered a draft formation text to the Commission.45 UNCI-
TRAL reviewed the texts and decided to consolidate them into
one volume.46 Additionally, the Commission recommended to
the General Assembly that it consider the 1978 UNCITRAL
text via a diplomatic conference of interested nations and orga-
nizations. 47 Based on the Commission's recommendation, a dip-
lomatic conference was organized by the General Assembly at
UNCITRAL's headquarters in Vienna from March to April
1980.48 All sectors of the world community were represented at
the Vienna Conference, which included delegations from sixty-
38 See id. at 1-13.
39 See United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2205 (XXI), available at
http://www.uncitral.org/en-main.htm.
40 See Galston, supra note 2, at 1-13.
41 Id.
42 See id.
43 See id.
44 See id. at 1-14.
45 See id.
46 See id.
47 See Galston, supra note 2, at 1-14.
4s See id.
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two nations and eight international organizations. 49 After con-
siderable debate, the UNCITRAL provisions were adopted with
relatively few amendments. 50 About 300 amendments were
submitted; however, few were incorporated into the final text.5 1
Despite several abstentions, the CISG was adopted without a
vote against it on April 11, 1980.52
B. Statutory Background/Legislative History of Relevant
CISG Articles
For the purpose of this note, it is essential to explore the
legislative history of the pertinent CISG articles applied by the
district court in Geneva, namely Articles 4, 8, 11, 14(1), 16(2)(b),
and 18(3). While the proceedings at the 1980 Vienna Diplo-
matic Conference represent an important component of the leg-
islative history of the Convention, much more significant
legislative history preceded the Conference. These sources in-
clude the Secretariat Commentary on the 1978 UNCITRAL
Draft Convention.53 The Secretariat Commentary is on the
1978 draft of the CISG, not the 1980 official text, which renum-
bered most of the articles of the 1978 draft.5 4 The Secretariat
Commentary, while not an official commentary, is the closest
counterpart to an official commentary on the CISG and is per-
haps the most authoritative source one can cite.55 The reasons
for priority of attention to the Secretariat Commentary are:
"(1) it summarizes and explains relevant conclusions derived from
the legislative history of the Convention prior to the Vienna Con-
ference; (2) it was used extensively by the delegates to the Vienna
Conference as a guide to the meaning of the provisions of the 1978
draft they considered; (3) based on this Secretariat Commentary
and their further deliberations, in most cases the delegates ap-
49 See id.
50 See id.
51 See FRITZ ENDERLEIN & DIETRICH MASKOW, INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW:
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF
GOODS: CONVENTION ON THE LIMITATION PERIOD IN THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF
GOODS 3 (Oceana Publications, 1992).
52 See id.
53 See Legislative History - Summary of UNCITRAL Legislative History of the
CISG at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/linkd.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2002).
54 See Guide to CISG Articles at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu.
55 See Legislative History - 1980 Vienna Diplomatic Conference, at http://
www.cisg.law.pace.edu (last visited Oct. 5, 2002).
[Vol. 16:165
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol16/iss1/7
20041 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS 173
proved these provisions of the 1978 draft either verbatim or sub-
stantially as written; (4) as an official document prepared
pursuant to a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly,
the Secretariat Commentary is the closest available equivalent to
an Official Commentary on the Convention; and (5) like the Con-
vention, it is obvious from its source and contents that the Secre-
tariat Commentary is not designed to favor legal interpretations
prevalent in any one legal system over another."56
Other sources that will be used to determine the legislative his-
tory of relevant CISG articles are the UNCITRAL proceedings
during the ten years that preceded the 1980 Vienna Diplomatic
Conference,57 Official Comments on Articles of the UNIDROIT
Principles, and antecedent uniform law legislation,58 including
the ULIS 59 and the ULF.60
CISG Article 4 provides that the "convention governs only
the formation of the contract of sale and the rights and obliga-
tions of the seller and the buyer arising from such contract."61
It further states that the Convention "is not concerned with the
validity of the contract, or any of its provisions, or of any us-
age."62 According to the Secretariat Commentary, the scope of
the Convention is limited to governing the formation of the con-
tract of sale, and the rights and obligations of the seller and the
buyer arising from a contract of sale, unless otherwise expressly
provided for in the Convention. 63 Article 4(a) clearly points to
CISG Article 11 for further explanation.
CISG Article 11 states that, "a contract of sale need not be
concluded in or evidenced by writing and is not subject to any
other requirement as to form."64 The Secretariat Commentary
focuses on the elimination of writing as evidence of a contract,
due in part to the fact that many contracts for the international
sale of goods are presently concluded by various modern modes
56 CISG Legislative History Guidance, at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edulcisg/
text/roadmap/RoadmapL-14.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2002).
57 See Guide to CISG Articles, supra note 54.
58 See id.
59 See id.
60 See id.
61 CISG, supra note 3, art. 4.
62 CISG, supra note 3, art. 4(a).
63 See Guide to CISG Article 4 - Secretariat Commentary, at http://
www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/secomnsecomm-04.html.
64 CISG, supra note 3, art. 11.
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of communication. 65 However, the official comments to Article
1.2 of the UNIDROIT Principles (which also state that form is
not required) assert that "although the article mentions only
the requirement of writing, it may be extended to exclude other
requirements as to form."6 6 Furthermore, the official comment
to UNIDROIT Principle Article 3.2, states that "a contract is
concluded, modified or terminated by the mere agreement of the
parties, without any further requirements;" confirms that there
is no need for consideration. 67 In the U.S. and other common
law countries, "consideration is seen as a requirement for the
validity, enforceability, modification, or termination of a con-
tract."68 However, in a commercial setting, obligations are as-
sumed by both parties to a contract, thus relegating the
requirement of consideration to limited practical significance. 69
Furthermore, it is for this reason that "CISG Article 29(1) dis-
penses with the requirement of consideration in relation to the
modification and termination by the parties of contracts for the
international sale of goods." 70 Seemingly, Article 11 "extends
this approach to the conclusion, modification and termination of
international commercial contracts, which can only bring about
greater certainty and reduce litigation."71
CISG Articles 14 and 18(3) are relevant to the offer and ac-
ceptance aspects of international goods contract formation.
CISG Article 14(1) provides that "a proposal for concluding a
contract addressed to one or more specific persons constitutes
an offer if it is sufficiently definite and indicates the intention of
the offeror to be bound in case of acceptance." 72 Furthermore,
the Article states, "a proposal is sufficiently definite if it indi-
cates the goods and expressly or implicitly fixes or makes provi-
sion for determining the quantity and the price."73 The Article
itself seems to adequately define "sufficiently definite;" how-
65 See Guide to CISG Article 11 - Secretariat Commentary, at http:/!
www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/secomm/secomm- 11.html.
66 Use of the UNIDROIT Principles to Help Interpret CISG Article 11, at http:/
/www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/principles/unill.html.
67 See id.
68 See id.
69 See id.
70 See id.
71 See id.
72 CISG, supra note 3, art. 14(1).
73 Id.
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ever, the "indication of an intention to be bound" is quite ambig-
uous. The Secretariat Commentary states that, "since there are
no particular words that must be used to indicate such an inten-
tion, it may sometimes require a careful examination of the 'of-
fer' in order to determine whether such an intention existed."74
Moreover, the Secretariat commentary pronounces that, "if no
single communication was labeled by the parties as an 'offer' or
as an 'acceptance,' the requisite intention to be bound will be
established in accordance with the rules of interpretation con-
tained in CISG Article 8."75
CISG Article 8 outlines the rules of interpretation regard-
ing the intent of a party to be bound to a contract. 76 Intent is to
be determined by statements made and other conduct of a party
"where the other party knew or could not have been unaware
what that intent was."77 Additionally, Article 8 provides a rea-
sonable person test to be applied when seeking to resolve the
intent of a party. "Statements made by and other conduct of a
party are to be interpreted according to his intent where the
other party knew or could not have been unaware what that
intent was."7 8 Moreover, Article 8(2) explains, "statements
made by and other conduct of a party are to be interpreted ac-
cording to the understanding that a reasonable person of the
same kind as the other party would have had in the same cir-
cumstances."79 Finally, the Article states that "due considera-
tion is to be given to all relevant circumstances of the case
including the negotiations, any practices which the parties have
established between themselves, usages and any subsequent
conduct of the parties." 0 The Article 8(3) proviso that states,
"...due consideration must be given to all relevant circum-
stances of the case," which then goes on to enumerate some of
the possible relevant circumstances, has been debated as to the
exclusivity of the list of circumstances.81 However, the Secreta-
74 CISG Article 14 - Secretariat Commentary, at http://www.cisg.law.pace.
edu/cisg/text/secommlsecomm-14.html [last visited Oct. 5, 2002].
75 See id.
76 CISG Article 8- Secretariat Commentary, at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/
cisgltext/secomm/secomm-08.html [last visited Jan. 2004].
77 CISG, supra note 3, art. 8.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 See CISG, supra note 3, art. 8(3).
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riat Commentary provides some guidance by stating that the
list contained in the Article does "not necessarily include all cir-
cumstances of the case that are to be taken into account."8 2
Also, it has been said that, "the rules of interpretation laid
down in CISG Article 8 have no direct predecessor in the ULF
or ULIS. Nevertheless, they can be traced back to experience
gained with the rules of interpretation scattered throughout
those two laws."8 3 Thus, in ascertaining the legislative history
of Article 8, it is necessary to examine the CISG antecedents
ULIS and ULF. ULIS Article 9(3) and ULF Article 13(2) are
identical, and assert "where expression, provisions or form of
contract commonly used in commercial practice are employed,
they shall be interpreted according to the meaning usually
given to them in the trade concerned."8 4 Based on the experi-
ence gained under ULIS/ULF rules of interpretation, intent
may be determined through a "course of dealing."85 A course of
dealing consists of "practices that have developed between the
parties in the course of protracted business relations."8 6 Addi-
tionally, "the rules established by ULIS and ULF imply that if
the parties' subjective intentions do not coincide, the objective
meaning of their declarations must be determined by interpre-
tation."8 7 Therefore, declarations made by parties engaged in
international trade will almost always be subject to some form
of interpretation in order to better assess the overall intent of
the parties.8
CISG Article 18(3) applies to the acceptance aspect of con-
tract formation.8 9 CISG Article 18(3) declares that:
82 See Annotated Text of CISG Article 8 - Secretariat Commentary, at http:ll
www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisgtextsecomm/secomm-08.html [last visited Nov. 3,
2002].
83 COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF
GooDs 69 (Peter Schlechtriem ed., Oxford 1998) (quoting Wener Junge), available
at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/matchup/matchup-u-08.html [last visited
Nov. 3, 2002].
84 See Legislative History, CISG Anticedents, Match-up of CISG Article 8
with ULIS/ULF provisions (quoting ULIS Article 9(3) and ULF Article 13(2)), at
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/matchup/matchup-u-08.html [last visited
Nov. 3, 2002].
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 See id.
89 CISG, supra note 3, art. 18.
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if by virtue of the offer or as a result of practices which the parties
have established between themselves or of usage, the offeree may
indicate assent by performing an act, such as one relating to the
dispatch of the goods or payment of the price, without notice to
the offeror, the acceptance is effective at the moment the act is
performed, provided that the act is performed within a reasonable
amount of time, if not time is fixed, with due account taken of the
circumstances of the transaction.90
The Secretariat Commentary defines "the act" necessary to es-
tablish acceptance as "an act authorized by the offer, recognized
practice, or usage."91 Customarily, the "act" would be the ship-
ment of the goods or the payment of the contract price, however
it could also be another act performed by a party.9 2 The
UNIDROIT Principles concur with the commentary's interpre-
tation, stating that, "provided that the offer does not impose
any particular mode of acceptance, the indication of assent may
either be made by an express statement or be inferred from the
conduct of the offeree." 93
CISG Article 16(2)(b) has a significant relationship to the
Geneva decision. It provides, in part, that an offer cannot be
revoked "if it was reasonable for the offeree to rely on the offer
as being irrevocable and the offeree has acted in reliance on the
offer." 94 This would seemingly create an implied form of prom-
issory estoppel. The UNIDROIT Principles help clarify the
meaning and intent of the above language. The offeree's reli-
ance on an 'offer' "may have been induced either by the conduct
of the offeror, or by the nature of the offer itself (e.g., an offer
whose acceptance requires extensive and costly investigation on
the part of the offeree or an offer made with a view to permit-
ting the offeree, in turn, to make an offer to a third party)."95
Furthermore, the UNIDROIT Principles state that "the acts
that the offeree must have performed in reliance on the offer
90 Id. (emphasis added).
91 See Guide to CISG Article 18 - Secretariat Commentary, at http:fl
www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/secomn/secomm-18.html [last visited Oct. 5,
20021.
92 See id.
93 See Use of the UNIDROIT Principles to Help Interpret CISG Article 18, at
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/principles/unil8.html [last visited Jan. 2004].
94 CISG, supra note 3, art. 16(2)(b).
95 See Use of the UNIDROIT Principles to Help Interpret CISG Article 16, at
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/principles/unil6.html [last visited Jan. 2004].
13
PACE INT'L L. REV.
may consist of making preparations for production, buying or
hiring of materials or equipment, incurring expenses, etc., pro-
vided that such acts could have been regarded as normal in the
trade concerned, or should otherwise have been foreseen by, or
known to, the offeror."96 Unfortunately, the Secretariat Com-
mentary does not comment on the possible "implicit" promissory
estoppel nature of Article 16(2)(b); however, the UNIDROIT
principles seemingly interpret the article as such.
III. DISCUSSION OF GENEVA PHARMAcEuTIcALs TECHNOLOGY
CORP. v. BARR LABORATORIES, INC./APOTHECON, INC. v.
BARR LABORATORIES, INC.
A. Facts and Procedural History
The defendant ACIC/Brantford ("ACIC"), a Canadian cor-
poration, manufactured a chemical ingredient (clathrate) for
use in the production of an anticoagulant medication (warfarin
sodium).97  In 1994, ACIC supplied plaintiff, Geneva
Pharmaceuticals Technology Corp. ("Pharmaceuticals"), a
United States company, with samples of clathrate, and in 1995
confirmed that it would support Pharmaceuticals' application
for the approval by the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA")
as the supplier of the ingredient for the manufacture of the
drug.98 In 1995, ACIC also issued a reference letter to the FDA
confirming it would serve as supplier of clathrate to Barr.99
Later in 1995, ACIC executed a confidential contract for the ex-
clusive supply of commercial quantities of clathrate to Barr. 100
This contract stated that a material breach would occur if ACIC
were to proceed with sales of commercial quantities to
Pharmaceuticals.10 1 When Pharmaceuticals received approval
for the manufacture of the drug in 1997, it submitted a
purchase order to ACIC for the purchase of commercial quanti-
ties of clathrate, which was refused by ACIC. 10 2
96 See id.
97 See Geneva, supra note 1, at 242, 248.
98 See id. at 251-52.
99 See id. at 248.
100 See id. at 249, and 261-62.
101 See id. at 249.
102 Geneva at 245.
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Pharmaceuticals claimed that, under the CISG, it had a
contract with ACIC for the sale of commercial quantities of
clathrate, and that ACIC breached that contract by refusing to
supply the ingredient after the drug was approved.10 3
Pharmaceuticals argued that, according to industry practice,
supplying sufficient quantities of clathrate to support an FDA
application creates a contract for future supply.10 4
Pharmaceuticals also claimed that ACIC should be liable under
the doctrine of promissory estoppel under the law of the State of
New Jersey. 10 5 Pharmaceuticals contended that a claim of
promissory estoppel based on the otherwise applicable domestic
law is not preempted by and does not conflict with the CISG.1Or
Judge Robert W. Sweet decided this case on May 10, 2002,
in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.
As to the applicable law, the court held that the claim should be
decided in accordance with the CISG because the alleged sales
contract involved the international sale of goods.' 0 7 As to the
merits of the case, the court held that under Article 9 of the
CISG, "the usages and practices of the industry are automati-
cally incorporated into any agreement governed by the CISG,
unless explicitly excluded by the parties." 0 8 Thus, the court
agreed with Pharmaceuticals' argument that industry practice
should be analyzed at trial in order to determine whether a con-
tract existed. 0 9
The court analyzed the elements of offer, acceptance, valid-
ity, and performance relevant to the question of contract forma-
tion under the CISG.110 The court held that based on the facts
alleged by Pharmaceuticals, the contract of future supply was
sufficiently definite under Article 14 of the CISG. 1 ' On the
topic of acceptance, the court held that under Article 18(3), the
provision of the reference letter could qualify as an act indicat-
103 See id. at 261-262.
104 See Geneva, supra note 1, at 282.
105 See id. at 286.
106 See id.
107 See id. at 281.
108 See id.
109 See Geneva, supra note 1, at 282.
110 See id. at 281.
111 See id. at 281-82.
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ing assent to a contract. 112 The court analyzed the nature of the
contract and held that, based on Articles 14 and 18 of the CISG,
a contract was formed.11 3 Whether ACIC's acts actually indi-
cated assent to a contract would be analyzed at trial on the ba-
sis of industry custom.' 1 4
The court also examined Pharmaceuticals' argument that
"consideration" was lacking as a question of validity."1 5 The
court held that validity of the contract, pursuant to Article 4(a),
is to be decided under domestic law determined by the applica-
tion of conflict of laws analysis.1 16 The court held that New
Jersey law should apply.11 7 Applying New Jersey law, the court
held that consideration was sufficient on the basis of the alleged
facts.118
Finally, the court agreed with Pharmaceuticals that a do-
mestic law claim for promissory estoppel does not conflict with
the CISG." 9 The court noted that the state law of promissory
estoppel is generally preempted by the CISG when used to
avoid the need to prove the existence of a "firm offer" pursuant
to Article 16(2)(b).1 20 However, the court also held that a state
law promissory estoppel claim is not preempted when used to
prove that a promise was made on which Pharmaceuticals re-
lied. 121 According to the court, because the CISG does not ex-
press a reliance principle in its determination of whether or not
a contract has been formed, the state law doctrine of promissory
estoppel applies in circumstances where no contract is
formed.1 22 Thus, under this decision, promissory estoppel is
preserved as an independent state law claim in the event that
the court concludes that no contract has been formed.
112 See Geneva, supra note 1, at 282.
113 See id.
114 See id.
115 See id. at 283-84.
116 See id.
117 See id.
118 See Geneva, supra note 1, at 283-84.
119 See id. at 286-87.
120 See id.
121 See id.
122 See id.
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IV. ANALYSIS
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York had the task of determining the applicability of the CISG
to the Geneva case. The district court correctly recognized the
international nature of the contract as a whole under Articles
14 and 18 of the CISG and offer and acceptance based on CISG
Articles 14 and 18(3). However, the decision of the district court
was clearly flawed with respect to the "consideration" issue,
pursuant to CISG Articles 4 and 11, and the modified form of
promissory estoppel articulated in CISG Article 16(2)(b).
Pursuant to CISG Article 1, which states that the CISG
"applies to contracts of sale of goods between parties whose
places of business are in different states when the States are
Contracting States,"1 23 the district court correctly identified the
parties to the contract as being a Canadian corporation (ACIC)
and a U.S. company (Pharmaceuticals). Additionally, the de-
fault governing nature of the CISG with respect to international
contracts, unless specifically excluded pursuant to Article 6 of
the CISG, 124 authorizes its use in governing the particular con-
tract at issue in this case. Therefore, the district court correctly
identified the international character of the ACIC/Pharmaceuti-
cals transaction based on the fact that the basic requirement of
Article 1 was met and thus its initial application of the CISG
was proper.
The district court also, accurately identified the existence of
offer and acceptance pursuant to CISG Articles 14 and 18(3).
Article 14 of the CISG states two requirements for the creation
of an offer: it must (1) be "sufficiently definite," meaning that it
"indicates the goods and expressly or implicitly fixes or makes
provision for determining the quantity and price" and (2) "indi-
cate the intention of the offeror to be bound in case of accept-
ance." 25 Here, Pharmaceuticals argued that the reference
letter provided by Barr in connection with the development of
warfarin sodium constitutes an offer, and Pharmaceuticals' sub-
sequent conveyance of the letter to the FDA constitutes a com-
mitment that ACIC would supply commercial quantities of
123 CISG, supra note 3, art. 1.
124 CISG, supra note 3, art. 6 (Article 6 states, "the parties may exclude the
application of this convention.").
125 CISG, supra note 3, art. 14.
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clathrate to Pharmaceuticals. Pharmaceuticals claimed that a
well-established custom in the industry is the reliance on im-
plied, unwritten supply commitments. 126 Additionally, ACIC
affirmed under oath that, "the predominant practice is for these
commitments not to be embodied in formal legal documents." 127
Furthermore, ACIC stated:
When a supplier provides access to a manufacturer to its Drug
Master File and the manufacturer relies upon such access as the
basis of its New Drug Submission, it is the custom and the under-
standing of both the manufacturer and the supplier that, upon the
issuance of the Notice of Compliance, the supplier will supply the
product.128
"The alleged contract clearly identifies the goods at issue, clath-
rate."1 29 "Pharmaceuticals alleges that the parties had already
agreed to a price and to the production of 'commercial quanti-
ties' of clathrate and admitted no discussion took place regard-
ing a delivery schedule." 30 "However, accepting as true
Pharmaceuticals' allegations of an industry custom, the con-
tract was sufficiently definite."131 Further, the alleged contract
indicated Pharmaceuticals' intention to be bound; it would only
send a purchase order if it in fact needed a commercial quantity
of clathrate.132
The Oberlandesgericht (Provincial Court of Appeal) Frank-
furt, in a case in which a Swiss seller brought an action against
a German buyer for payment of the purchase price of 330 boxes
of textile yarn, refused to find the existence of an offer. 133 Pur-
suant to CISG Article 14, the court ruled that the plaintiffs in-
voice to the buyer failed to sufficiently define the goods, the
quantity, and the price, and thus could not be considered as an
effective offer. 134 However, the court ruled that under CISG Ar-
ticle 8, a "reasonable person" test must be applied regarding the
126 See Geneva, supra note 1, at 282.
127 See id.
128 Id.
129 See id.
130 See id.
131 See id.
132 See id.
133 Germany 30 August 2000 Appellate Court Frankfurt, available at http:l
cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/000830gl.html.
134 See id.
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legitimacy of the offer. Therefore, it must be established that a
reasonable person in the position of the buyer would have un-
derstood the invoice as an offer for sale. 135 The court stated
that that was not established. In contrast, in Geneva the goods
were sufficiently defined in the reference letter and based on
trade usage, Pharmaceuticals reasonably construed the refer-
ence letter to be an offer. Therefore, based on the reasonable
person standard, Pharmaceuticals could infer that the reference
letter represented an offer.
Furthermore, in United Technologies International Inc. /
Pratt and Whitney Commercial Engine Business v. Magyar Legi
Kozlekedesi Vallalat (Malev Hungarian Airlines),136 Pratt and
Whitney ("Pratt"), an American manufacturer of aircraft en-
gines, engaged in extensive negotiations with Malev, a Hun-
garian manufacturer of Tupolev aircraft ("Malev"). Malev made
two alternative offers of different types of aircraft engines with-
out quoting an exact price. Pratt chose the type of engine from
the ones offered and placed an order. The Legfelsobb Birosag
(Supreme Court) of Hungary found, pursuant to Article 14(1),
that "the offer and acceptance in this transaction were vague
and, as such, ineffective since they failed to explicitly or implic-
itly fix or make provisions for determining the price of the air-
craft engines ordered."' 37
In Geneva, however, the contract clearly identifies the
goods at issue, and allegations existed that the parties had al-
ready agreed to a price and to the production of "commercial
quantities" of clathrate.138 This would fulfill the requirement of
the Supreme Court of Hungary, that the price be determined
explicitly or implicitly. Additionally, the U.S. District Court for
Southern District of New York, in making its determination, ac-
cepted as true Pharmaceuticals' allegations of an industry cus-
tom. Based on these facts and allegations, the district court
135 See id.
136 United Technologies International Inc./Pratt and Whitney Commercial En-
gine Business v. Magyar Legi Kozlekedesi Vallalat (Malev Hungarian Airlines),
Legfelsobb Birosag (Supreme Court - Hungary), Sept. 25, 1992, available at http:/!
cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/920925h1.html [last visited Oct. 5, 2002].
137 See id.
138 See Geneva, supra note 1, at 281-82.
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found that the contract was sufficiently definite to constitute an
offer. 139
The district court also addressed whether an acceptance
had occurred between the parties. 140 Relying on the provision
of the CISG addressing oral offers, the defendant (ACIC) argued
that the offer had to be accepted immediately. 141 However,
Pharmaceuticals relied on a contract established by the conduct
of the parties. In such a situation, CISG Article 18(3) applies.
It states that, "the offeree may indicate assent by performing an
act, such as one relating to the dispatch of goods or payment of
the price," and "the acceptance is effective at the moment the
act if performed, provided the act is performed" either within
the time fixed by the offeror, or if no such time is fixed, within a
reasonable time.142 It is also necessary to apply CISG Article
8(3) to the analysis. Article 8(3) provides that "in determining
the intent of the party, or the understanding a reasonable per-
son would have had, due consideration is to be given to all rele-
vant circumstances including trade usages.' 1 43
Pharmaceuticals alleges that it was industry custom that the
provision of a reference letter and its subsequent submission to
the FDA indicates acceptance.' 44 Moreover, Pharmaceuticals
has had an extensive course of dealing with ACIC that would
fulfill the reasonable person test expressed in Article 8(3).
The district court incorrectly addressed the issue of "consid-
eration" with respect to the present transaction. The court
should have relied on court decisions outside American jurisdic-
tions before ruling that New Jersey domestic law applies to this
transaction and thus a requirement of "consideration" exists.
In a decision of the Court of Arbitration of the International
Chamber of Commerce Case No. 9474 decided in February
1999,145 the court held that "consideration" was not a require-
ment in determining the validity of the contract at issue. In
that case, the plaintiff bank entered into a contract with defen-
139 See id. at 282.
140 See id.
141 See id.
142 CISG, supra note 3, art. 18.
143 CISG, supra note 3, art. 8(3).
144 Id.
145 ICC Arbitration Case No. 9474 of February 1999, available at http:ll
cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/999474il.html last visited Oct. 5, 2002].
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dant for printing and delivery of banknotes.146 According to the
defendant, once the banknotes were delivered and received, the
bank did not fulfill any of its' obligations. 147 The bank's repre-
sentations and statements evinced a "relinquishment of rights
and an intent not to assert any rights, i.e. a waiver or estoppel
of its rights."14 s According to the court, the bank is estopped
from asserting claims of non-performance against the defendant
due to the defendant's continued reliance on the bank's assur-
ance of performance, the bank's inconsistent conduct and the
subsequent harm that resulted. 149 Moreover, according to "the
rules applied in international practice, a forfeiture of rights can
be said to occur without consideration or reliance."150 Hence,
consideration is not a necessary component for the amendment
of a sales transaction.' 51
Similarly, in Calzaturificio Claudia S.N.C. v. Olivieri Foot-
wear Ltd.,152 the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York held that, "unlike the UCC, under the CISG, a con-
tract need not be evidenced by a writing."153 Furthermore, the
court held that "a contract of sale is not subject to any other
requirement as to form." 154 "Consequently, the standard UCC
inquiry regarding whether a writing is fully or partially inte-
grated has little meaning under the CISG and courts are there-
fore less constrained by the 'four corners' of the instrument in
construing terms of the contract."155 In this case, Calza-
turificio, an Italian manufacturer of shoes, alleged that Olivieri
had agreed to purchase shoes but had failed to pay the price for
four lots. 156 The court determined that a contract governed by
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 See id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Clazaturificio Claudia S.N.C. v. Olivieri Footwear Ltd., 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4586 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 1998), available at http://cisgw.3.law.pace.edu/cases
/980406ul.html [last visited Jan. 2004].
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id.
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the CISG is not subject to any requirements as to form. 157 A
requirement as to form includes "consideration."158
In Geneva, the district court, using Fregara v. Jet Aviation
Business Jets, concluded that the "essential requirement of con-
sideration is a bargained-for exchange of promises or perform-
ance that may consist of an act, forbearance, or the creation,
modification, or destruction of a legal relation."15 9 The court,
while referring to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, as-
serted that Pharmaceuticals maintains, "that the consideration
for the implied-in-fact contract was primarily its forbearance,
claiming it relied on ACIC/Brantford's reference letter in con-
nection with its submission to the FDA."160
However, based on existing international case law and ex-
plicit language in the CISG, consideration is not required. Arti-
cle 4 limits the sphere of application to the rules on formation of
contract. The CISG's rules on the formation of contract do not
expressly apply to validity of the contract issues.1 61 Therefore,
domestic law should govern issues concerning the validity of a
contract.162 "This deference to domestic provisions regarding
validity is only binding, however, so long as the convention does
not include an express provision to the contrary... [a]s a result,
domestic law regulates such matters as the capacity to contract
and the consequences of mistake, gross unfairness, unconscio-
nability and fraud."' 63 Seemingly, this is the provision that the
district court applied in the present case. Yet, the court should
have continued its examination of the CISG, because if it had, it
would have been directed to Article 11. Article 11 expressly
provides that "a contract of sale need not be concluded in or evi-
denced by writing and is not subject to any other requirement
as to form."' 64 Requirements as to form would include "consid-
eration." Pursuant to CISG Article 11, there is an express pro-
vision asserting that "consideration" is not a necessary element.
157 Id.
158 See Clazaturificio, supra note 152.
159 See Geneva, supra note 1, at 283.
160 Id.
161 See PETER SCHLECHTRIEM, UNIFORM SALES LAW - THE UN-CoNVENTION ON
CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 31 (1986).
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 CISG, supra note 3, art. 11.
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Therefore, the district court incorrectly examines the issue of
"consideration," despite the fact that the CISG expressly pro-
vides that it is not a necessary element and that deference is
only paid to domestic law in the event that the CISG does not
address a particular issue. Here, Article 11 expressly addresses
this issue and New Jersey domestic law should not have been
applied.
The district court also improperly held that New Jersey do-
mestic law applies to a promissory estoppel claim by
Pharmaceuticals rather than the modified version of promissory
estoppel articulated in CISG Article 16(2)(b). Article 16(2)(b)
provides that an offer is irrevocable "if it was reasonable for the
offeree to rely on the offer as being irrevocable and the offeree
has acted in reliance on the offer."165
The district court should have relied on Vienna Arbitration
Proceeding SCH-4318 decided on June 15, 1994.166 In that
case, an Austrian seller and a German buyer entered into a con-
tract for the sale of rolled metal sheets. 167 The agreed upon de-
livery terms of the goods were installments "FOB Rostock."' 68
The buyer received the first two deliveries and subsequently
sold the rolled metal sheets to a Belgian company who then
shipped them to a Portuguese manufacturer. 169 The Portu-
guese manufacturer determined that the goods were defective
and refused to accept any further deliveries of the goods. 170 The
German buyer sent a notice of non-conformity of the goods with
contract specifications to the Austrian seller, but the seller re-
fused to pay damages, alleging the untimely character of the
notice. 171 The buyer then commenced the arbitration proceed-
ing. The buyer argued that the seller had waived its right to
raise the defense that notice of non-conformity was not timely
given, but the arbitrator held that the intention of a party to
waive this right must be clearly established.172 Based on this
165 CISG, supra note 3, art. 16(2)(b).
166 Vienna Arbitration Proceeding SCH-4318, June 15, 1994, available at http:/
/cisgw.law.pace.edu/cases/940615a4.html.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Vienna Arbitration Proceeding SCH-4318, supra note 150.
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burden of proof, the arbitrator determined that a waiver by the
seller did not occur. "However, since the seller had behaved in
such a way that the buyer was led to believe that the seller
would not raise the defense (e.g., after receiving the notice, the
seller had continued to ask the buyer to provide information on
the status of the complaints and had pursued negotiations with
a view to reach a settlement),"173 the arbitrator held that,
"while estoppel was not expressly settled by the CISG, it formed
a general principle underlying the CISG, based on Article
16(2)(b)." 174 Thus, the arbitrator awarded damages to the
buyer for lack of conformity of the goods.' 75
In Geneva, the district court stated, "the fact that Article
16(2)(b) appears to employ a modified version of promissory es-
toppel suggests that if a plaintiff were to bring a promissory
estoppel claim to avoid the need to prove the existence of a 'firm
offer,' the claim would be preempted by the CISG."' 76
Pharmaceuticals utilized "promissory estoppel to prove that a
promise on which it relied should be recognized as binding as if
it were a contract.1 77 The court stated that if the CISG had
contemplated a "reliance" principle in its determination of
whether a contract had been formed, this promissory estoppel
claim would be preempted. 78
Many commentaries seem to disagree with the courts' ap-
plication of Article 16(2)(b) and its limited application to "firm
offers." "The provision is designed to cover those cases in which
not just the offer itself, but rather other conduct by the offeror
or the special circumstances and exigencies of the proposed
transaction enable and necessitate the offeree's presumption
that the offer would be valid for a certain length of time." 179
The American promissory estoppel doctrine is very similar to
Article 16(2)(b), with one critical difference. 80 The American
promissory estoppel doctrine explicitly states that the offeree's
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Geneva, supra note 1, at 286-87.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Schlechtriem, supra note 145, at 52.
180 Henry Mather, Firm Offers Under the UCC and the CISG, 105 DICK. L.
REV. 31, 48 (2000).
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reliance must have been foreseeable to the offeror and that the
offeree's reliance be detrimental; Article 16(2)(b) of the CISG
does not.181 However, despite the lack of express language re-
quiring those elements, they are provided for in Geneva. Based
on trade usage and a course of dealing between Pharmaceuti-
cals and ACIC, Pharmaceuticals relied on the reference letter
as being equivalent to a contract. Therefore, it would have been
foreseeable to ACIC that Pharmaceuticals would rely on the let-
ter as binding. Furthermore, the lack of an express language
requiring that the offeree's reliance be detrimental is not deter-
minative. If an offeree relies, as Pharmaceuticals did, and the
offeror subsequently breaches, that reliance will always be det-
rimental to the offeree. Additionally, and despite these omis-
sions in the express language of 16(2)(b), "it can be expected
that many tribunals will apply Article 16(2)(b) in much the
same fashion as American courts have used promissory estop-
pel."1 8 2 A court applying Article 16(2)(b) could determine that
an offeree's reliance on an offer being irrevocable was unreason-
able if the reliance was not reasonably foreseeable to the
offeror. 183
This would not be the case in Geneva. Again, based on
trade usage and a prior course of dealing between the two par-
ties, it should have been reasonably foreseeable to ACIC that
Pharmaceuticals would rely on the binding nature of the refer-
ence letter. The offeree must seemingly have "(1) had a good
reason for believing that the offer was irrevocable and (2) acted
reasonably in relying on that belief (i.e. did not engage in a fool-
hardy form of reliance)." 18 4 Furthermore, if the offeree were to
use the offer in preparing his own offer to a third person or were
to undertake a costly investigation in order to decide whether to
accept the offer, "both provisions will probably be met so long as
the offeror had some understanding of the offeree's position."
1 8 5
The latter would seemingly apply in this case since
Pharmaceuticals undertook a costly investigation in order to
satisfy several FDA required steps in order to commence pro-
181 See id.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 48-49.
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duction of warfarin sodium. It is evident that the CISG contem-
plates a modified or implicit version of promissory estoppel and
the district court incorrectly allowed New Jersey domestic law
to govern the issue through its injudicious reading of CISG Arti-
cle 16(2)(b).
Therefore, the district court's misguided application of New
Jersey law rather than relevant CISG provisions, with respect
to the "consideration" and promissory estoppel issues, effec-
tively undermines the intention of the CISG to govern and en-
sure the observance of good faith in international trade, as well
as creating a uniform set of rules governing contracts for the
international sale of goods. It also illustrates the U.S. courts'
reluctance to accept the CISG's governing capabilities when
U.S. corporations are involved in international sales disputes.
V. CONCLUSION
The United States and other States' Parties entered into
the CISG, intending it to govern and ensure the observance of
good faith in international trade. Article 7 of the CISG provides
the following:
(1) In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to
its international character and to the need to promote uniformity
in its application and the observance of good faith in international
trade.
(2) Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention
which are not expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity
with the general principles on which it is based or in the absence
of such principles, in conformity with the law applicable by virtue
of the rules of private international law.1 8 6
"The general scheme of Article 7 is that the judge should
give an 'international' rather than a 'domestic' interpretation to
the CISG."187 Pursuant to Article 7(1), a judge should not ini-
tially look to any domestic law when interpreting any provisions
of the CISG. s8s The focus of the judge should strictly be on the
186 CISG, supra note 3, art. 7.
187 Phanesh Koneru, The International Interpretation of the UN Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: An Approach Based on General
Principles, 6 MiNN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 105, 106 (1997).
188 Id.
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overall intention of the CISG.18 9 Article 7(2) explicitly states
that the source of interpretation of the CISG should be the text
of the CISG itself.190 If an issue is not specifically identified
within the text of the CISG, the "general principles" on which it
is based should be examined. 191 The "general principles" are
not identified or described in its text; however, based on the
CISG text itself, the Secretariat Commentary and its legislative
history, it is feasible to determine many of those principles. 192
"In identifying those general principles, it should be kept in
mind that the CISG's overall objective is to promote interna-
tional trade by removing legal barriers that arise from different
social, economic, and legal systems of the world." 93 The gen-
eral principles provision can have different effects on a legal
proceeding - "the narrow effect of guarding against the use of
local (and divergent) legal concepts in construing the specific
provisions" or "the broader effect of authorizing tribunals to cre-
ate new rules not directly based on the textual provisions." 94
The rationale for ascertaining the general principles of the
CISG is to produce the "narrow effect" discussed above and thus
assist in the prevention of domestic law interpretations of the
CISG.195 The law should be autonomous and interpreted
within its own "four corners;" American judges should not be
determinative in a dispute between parties from different coun-
tries. Here, however, the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York has applied New Jersey domestic law to
issues that should be governed by express CISG provisions.
The reluctance by the court to apply these provisions, despite
the truly international nature of the contract and the parties,
completely undermines the significance of the CISG. If U.S.
courts continue to rule in this manner, they will effectively sub-
vert and deem irrelevant the governing nature of the CISG in
international sales transactions.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 116-17.
193 See Koneru, supra note 187, at 116.
194 See id.
195 See id. at 117.
27
